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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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l8o ETHICS<br />

temper<strong>at</strong>ure melt, given the same conditions, it always melts<br />

<strong>at</strong> the same temper<strong>at</strong>ure, one example in the physical world<br />

thus behaving conformably with the behaviour of another<br />

like example. It is, therefore, Clarke pointed out, a char-<br />

acteristic of things to behave lawfully. M<strong>at</strong>hem<strong>at</strong>ics, in<br />

fact, applies to them. Similarly in the moral sphere; some<br />

things, he maintained, are conformable with, or are fitted<br />

to, our will in a way in which others are not This does<br />

not mean simply th<strong>at</strong> some things obey our wills and others<br />

thwart them. Wh<strong>at</strong> it does mean is th<strong>at</strong> some things are<br />

such as our wills n<strong>at</strong>urally prescribe to us; they are, in<br />

other words, such as we ought to do. These actions which<br />

our will n<strong>at</strong>urally prescribes to us possess wh<strong>at</strong> Clarke<br />

called a certain fitness, and this fitness God has given to<br />

them in just the same way as He has given laws to<br />

n<strong>at</strong>ure. The laws of n<strong>at</strong>ure are immutable; so is moral<br />

fitness, whereby certain kind* of action are conformable<br />

with our wills. Now it is by means of the moral sense th<strong>at</strong><br />

we recognize in regard to actions th<strong>at</strong> they are conformable<br />

and such as it is fitting for us to will.<br />

II. BUTLER<br />

Butler's Psychology. St<strong>at</strong>ements such as those of<br />

Hutcheson and Clarke are, so far as concerns their form<br />

of present<strong>at</strong>ion, little better than dogm<strong>at</strong>isms. Such and<br />

such, these philosophers say, is the case; and, broadly<br />

speaking, they leave it <strong>at</strong> th<strong>at</strong> It is possible th<strong>at</strong> they are<br />

right; it is also possible th<strong>at</strong>, as I hinted in the last chapter,<br />

j udgments to the effect th<strong>at</strong> so and so is ultim<strong>at</strong>ely valuable,<br />

or -th<strong>at</strong> so and so ought to be done, cannot in the long run<br />

be defended, Nevertheless, there is considerably more to<br />

be said from the objective intuitionist point of view than<br />

has so far been suggested. For a more developed st<strong>at</strong>ement<br />

I turn to Bishop Butler (1692-1752).<br />

Butler's avowed" object is to make an inventory ofthe con*<br />

tents of the human mind. His point of view is in part<br />

ethical; he not only tells us wh<strong>at</strong> the various elements

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