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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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<strong>THE</strong> PROBLEM OF FREE WILL<br />

Bearing of the Psychological Analysis upon Concepts of<br />

Will and Reason. Wh<strong>at</strong>, it may be asked, is the<br />

bearing of theie conclusions upon the question with which<br />

we are immedi<strong>at</strong>ely concerned the question of the freedom<br />

of the human will and, we may add, of the human<br />

reason? I include reason as well as will since, if there is<br />

to be freedom of choice two conditions <strong>at</strong> least must be<br />

s<strong>at</strong>isfied; there must be not only a will which can freely<br />

choose between two courses of action th<strong>at</strong> which appears<br />

to be the better, but a reason which can impartially<br />

estim<strong>at</strong>e and freely decide between the rel<strong>at</strong>ive worths of<br />

the two different courses under choice.<br />

Both these requisites offreedom are denied by the psychological<br />

analysis I have described. Its effect upon die will<br />

1<br />

has already been indic<strong>at</strong>ed in a previous chapter; will,<br />

if the psycho-analytic account can be accepted, is a sublim<strong>at</strong>ed<br />

form of desire, for the working of which we are<br />

no more responsible than for the promptings of desire<br />

undisguised.<br />

The effect upon reason is, from the point of view of<br />

freedom, no less detrimental. Reason tends to be exhibited<br />

as a mere tool or handmaid of desire. Its function is to<br />

secure the ends which we unconsciously set ourselves, by<br />

inventing excuses for wh<strong>at</strong> we instinctively want to do,<br />

and arguments for wh<strong>at</strong> we instinctively want to believe.<br />

There is, in fact, <strong>at</strong> bottom very little difference between<br />

reason and faith; for, if faith be defined as the power of<br />

believing wh<strong>at</strong> we know to be untrue, reason is the power<br />

of deceiving ourselves into believing th<strong>at</strong> wh<strong>at</strong> we want<br />

to think true, is in fact true.<br />

Reasoning fln^l R<strong>at</strong>ioittlfafag- We are accustomed to<br />

make a distinction between reasoning and r<strong>at</strong>ionalizing.<br />

Reasoning, we hold, is an honest, r<strong>at</strong>ionalizing a dis-<br />

honest use of reason. A person who reasons uses his mind<br />

to take impartial stock of the evidence, and permits his<br />

conclusions to he determined by wh<strong>at</strong> he finds; he does<br />

*See Chapter IV, pp. 114-116.

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