GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

874
ETHICS
then the fact that I do think it to
event in my past history,
be true, even die fact that I believe myself to be in a posi-
tion to prow it to be true, is no reason for thinking it to be
so. For to prove it, if to prove it to somebody, and die somebody
is no more responsible for being convinced by my
proof than am I for believing it to be convincing.
Detenninists do not think of applying these considera-
tions to the conclusions of their own reasonings. When, for
example, they are advocating detenninist views, they make
much of the impartial survey of the facts upon which their
reasoning is based, stress the rigour of die reasoning by
which they reach their conclusions, and draw attention
to the open-minded and dispassionate character of their
acceptance of the conclusions which necessarily follow
from the facts, wounding though these conclusions may
be to human pride, derogatory though they are .to human
dignity. But what right, it may be asked, have they to
claim impartiality for their survey of the evidence, validity
for the processes of their reasoning, and dispassionateness
for the acceptance, of their conclusion, if they deny the
possibility of impartiality in iry survey of the comparative
worths of alternative courses of action, and the dispassionateness
of my preference for one of them as bring the
better? For, if they insist that my judgment of what is
right and reasonable in the sphere of conduct is determined
for me by my past and not by me through my will, the same
will hold good of their judgments of what is true and
reasonable in the sphere of thought. That determinism is
true and reasonable is one such judgment, but in the degree
to which their arguments establish that it is true and
reasonable, in that degree does the conclusion invalidate
their arguments. For in showing that nobody ever embraces
determinism because he is really convinced by
the arguments for it, the detenninist takes all the convincingness
out of determinism.
(a) THAT IF DETERMINISM zs TRUE THE MIND
REFLECTS NOT THE FACTS BUT THE CONDITION