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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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33*<br />

ETHICS<br />

word higher? We can only conclude th<strong>at</strong> Mill regaitis<br />

certain other things besides pleasure, namely, those indic<strong>at</strong>ed<br />

by the words "superior quality/' when he speaks of<br />

"superior quality" pleasures! as being desirable, and th<strong>at</strong>,<br />

in so far as he does so, he gives up the hedonist position in<br />

the form in which he professes to hold it, namely, th<strong>at</strong><br />

pleasure is the only thing th<strong>at</strong> is desirable*<br />

It appears, then, to be impossible to hold th<strong>at</strong> pleasure<br />

is the only thing which is desirable, and yet to maintain<br />

th<strong>at</strong> pleasures can differ in quality.<br />

Th<strong>at</strong> we ought to Aim <strong>at</strong> the Gre<strong>at</strong>est Happiness of the<br />

Gre<strong>at</strong>est Number. The <strong>at</strong>tempt to answer the question,<br />

whose pleasure is entitled to count, leads Mill into<br />

even gre<strong>at</strong>er difficulties. The answer officially given to the<br />

question is "th<strong>at</strong> everybody is to count for one, and nobody<br />

for more than one". Let us consider this answer in the<br />

light of Mill's hedonist contentions. Broadly, three positions<br />

are possible: (A) th<strong>at</strong> I am so constituted th<strong>at</strong> I can only<br />

desire my own pleasure; (B) th<strong>at</strong> I can desire other things,<br />

but ought only to desire my own pleasure; (C) th<strong>at</strong> I can<br />

desire other things, but ought to desire the gre<strong>at</strong>est happiness<br />

on the whole, the gre<strong>at</strong>est happiness on the whole Being<br />

commonly taken to mean the gre<strong>at</strong>est happiness of the<br />

gre<strong>at</strong>est number of people. Bentham <strong>at</strong> various times holds<br />

all three positions. (A) It is the first law of n<strong>at</strong>ure, he<br />

says, to wish our own happiness, and his general view is,<br />

as we have seen, expressed in the assertion1 th<strong>at</strong> pleasure<br />

and pain are the two sovereign masters of human n<strong>at</strong>ure.<br />

He also holds (B) th<strong>at</strong>, since pleasure is a good, the most<br />

virtuous man is he who calcul<strong>at</strong>es most accur<strong>at</strong>ely how<br />

to promote his own pleasure. Virtue, in fact, is the habit<br />

of accur<strong>at</strong>ely estim<strong>at</strong>ing the course of conduct which is<br />

most likely to secure one's own happiness. (C) The gre<strong>at</strong>est<br />

happiness of the gre<strong>at</strong>est number is, Bentham holds, die<br />

ultim<strong>at</strong>e standard of value in a community, and is th<strong>at</strong><br />

<strong>at</strong> which the legisl<strong>at</strong>or should aim, the good legisl<strong>at</strong>or<br />

1 See p. 398.

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