GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

32O
ETHICS
to follow from, his action approximate to those which do
in fact follow from it In other words, intelligence, training,
and knowledge will go some way to ensure that intended
consequences will coincide with actual ones. The conclusion
seems to be that in a society of ideally judging
persons the difference between actual and intended
consequences would tend to disappear. Meanwhile, in the
degree to which a person or a society tends to approximate
to this ideal limit, to that degree will the disparity between
the consequences which are expected to follow from the
actions of that person, or that society, and those which
actually do follow from them, tend to disappear. At this
point, then, a formula for ethical progress both in societies
and in individuals suggests itself, some of the implications
of which I shall hope to develop in a later chapter. *
Sidgwick on the Intuitions of Common Sense Morality.
This preliminary discussion of the implications and diffi-
culties of both the "actual" and the "intended" conse-
quences types of utilitarian theory having been disposed
of, we are in a position to proceed with the exposition of
the theory. Before embarking upon it, however, I propose
to try to mitigate the sharpness of the contrast which I
have hitherto drawn between it and intuitionist theories.
I have already pointed out that certain forms of Intuition-
ism, by including within the scope of moral judgments
the intended consequences of actions, tend to approximate
to Utilitarianism. I have now to add that the utilitarians,
for their part, are far from always rejecting intuitions.
It should, in the first place, be clear in the light of
the condnrion of the discussion in Chapter V* on the
., subject of thewture of our recognition of ultimate values,
that somt intuitions must be involved in those judgments
of (he worth of consequences, by reference to which
/itilitariaas bold that the lightness of actions ought to be
assessed* For whatever the nature of the things which we
judge to be ultimately valuable, our judgment must, I
Sec Chapter XII, pp. 466-468. *See Chapter V, pp. 168-170.