GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

420
ETHICS
Now whatever is unique is indescribable. Colour is
unique, and any attempt to define or describe colour in
terms of anything else will, therefore, falsify it. Thus we
can recognize colour, but we cannot say what it is. Beauty,
again, is unique, and we cannot, therefore, describe beauty;
we can only recognize it Similarly with any other form
of value, and similarly, therefore, with that form of value
which we know as moral virtue. Moral virtue also is
unique and is also, therefore, indescribable. But the fact
that moral virtue and beauty are unique and indescribable
does not mean that we cannot recognize them, or that
we do not feel impelled to pursue them.
If beauty and moral virtue, together with other forms
of value are both unique and indescribable, we cannot,
it is obvious, give any reasons for our appreciation of the
one or of our effort to realize the other. This conclusion
has already been indicated in the course of the arguments
given in Chapter V for the view there called Ethical
Silence. Since, however, it constitutes one of the fundamental
contentions of the theory of value which I wish
to put forward, I shall venture to elaborate it 1 in its
application to that form of value with which Part II of
this book is specifically concerned, namely, moral virtue.
Moral virtue is a characteristic of persons. The charac-
teristic of being morally virtuous is one which we are able
to recognize in others, and which we endeavour, as I
shall try to show below, 1 to attain ourselves. My immediate
purpose is to emphasize the fact that we are not in a position
to answer the questions, "Why do we recognize moral
virtue to be valuable and why do we seek to attain it? ",
that, in short, we are not in a position to give an
account of moral virtue.
DIGRESSION ON MODES OF DESCRIPTION. The
expression "to give an account of, when used in such
sentences as "I believe that I am in a position to give an
1 See Conclusion (3), pp. 492-426 below.
1 See Conclusion (5), pp. 428, 429 below.