GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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OBJECTIVE UTILITARIANISM 317
example, a lunatic might feel convinced that the best
way to maximize the happiness of mankind was to cut
the throats of all red-haired men with freckles. What is
more, in order to realize his benevolent intentions he
take the
might} at considerable personal risk, actively
steps which, in his view, might be expected to produce
the desired increase of human happiness. Nevertheless,
it is difficult to regard a lunatic inspired by this conviction
as a really good man by any of the standards which are
relevant to a judgment of moral worth. And the reason
why we should refuse to give him full moral marks would
be found in our conviction that his judgment as to the
probable effects of his well-meaning actions on the
human happiness which he wished to promote, was
faulty.
It seems to follow that good will and good intentions
are not enough to enable a man to qualify as a virtuous
man; we also expect him to show good judgment. Now
good judgment entails a just appreciation of the probable
consequences of the line of conduct which we are proposing
to follow. We may, of course, be mistaken in our estimate
through no fault of our own. For example, the circumstances
may be other than we had supposed, or even
other than we had any right to suppose; again, all the
data relevant to our judgment may not be available;
it is conceivable that it may not have been possible to
make them available; or, yet again, some sudden catas-
trophe which there was no reason to expect, a fire, for
example, or a flood, a volcano eruption or an earthquake,
may make the consequences of an action other than we
had anticipated or had a right to anticipate. Nevertheless,
if, after having taken what would 'generally be considered
reasonable steps to obtain all the relevant data,
and having further taken all these relevant data into
account, one judges X to be a right action, having regard
to the consequences that X seems to one to be likely to
produc^, one is obviously entitled to a greater degree of
moral credit, than if one had made such a judgment on