GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

OBJECTIVE UTILITARIANISM 343
foundation of an egoistic psychology, we can assign no
meaning to the word "ought", except a meaning
derived from expediency. We can say, for example,
that a man ought to behave in a particular way because,
if he does, he will derive more satisfaction than he will
derive from behaving in any other way, but we cannot
say that he ought to behave in a particular way because
it is right, and right because it will promote the greatest
happiness of the greatest number of people. For there is
no reason why a man should wish to promote the greatest
happiness of the greatest number of people, except in so
far as it conduces to his own, and that it does not always
do this, has already been pointed out. The conclusion is
that an egoistic psychology can afford no basis for the
concept of duty. Yet the utilitarians were imbued with a
very proper respect for duty, and, though Bentham was
ought V' he said, "if
unregenerately logical "the wow! '
it means anything at all 'ought' to be excluded from the
dictionary" J. S. Mill inveighed, as we have seen, with
considerable emphasis against the selfish egoist.
(a) THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF AVOIDING THE
ADMISSION OF INTUITIONS. Directly he abandons
the psychology of Egoism, the utilitarian is driven to admit
some at least of the contentions of the intuitionist. For,
directly he says that we ought to do so and so, because
of such and such results which will follow if it is done,
he is implying that such and such results are desirable
and are such as ought to be promoted. In the long run,
there can be no basis for
as I have already tried to show1 ,
such a claim except an intuition which it is not to defend by
possible
reason.
Nor, as I have already pointed out, 1 does the utilitarian
disown intuitions. His theory entails, it is obvious, the
admission of such intuitions as that pleasure is the sole
good, that we ought to maximize pleasure on the whole,
and that the pleasure of every person is of equal value with
*See Chapter V, pp. 166-171. Sec pp. 322, 323 above.