GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

OBJECTIVE INTUITIONISM 2X7
morally more praiseworthy than that of ordinary men;
yet it would not generally be maintained that the ordinary
man is under any moral obligation to live it. An extreme
example is afforded by the case of a celibate priesthood.
Celibacy is enjoined upon its priesthood by one of the
most widely adopted religions in the world; yet celibacy,
though morally enjoined, cannot, it is obvious, be univer-
salized, if only because t if it were, there would be nobody
left to be celibate. Cases such as these cannot, it is clear,
be decided by the application of general formulae however
all-embracing the formulae are made. Each case must
be judged on its merits, and the obligation to judge on
merits implies the admission that in some cases judgment
may be difficult. We reach, therefore, the same conclusion
as before; it is not enough to will to do our duty; we
require also to find out wherein our duty lies, and it is
in respect of this latter requirement that Kant's theory
affords little or no assistance. Now it is a significant fact
that in practically every case in which we endeavour to
judge on merits two difficult moral alternatives, our judgment
is determined by an appeal to results. What, we ask
ourselves, will be the consequences, if I perform action X,
and what, if action Y? Yet the appeal to consequences
is precisely what Kant's strict form of Objective-Intui-
tionism excludes.
(3) THAT IT is NOT THE CASE, AS KANT SUGGESTS,
THAT OUR DUTY MUST BE ALWAYS DISAGREEABLE.
Perhaps the most important objection to Kant's theory is
the sharp distinction which it introduces between the real
world and the world of appearance. This distinction, which
runs right through man's nature bifurcating his personality,
as it were, into two parts, has particularly unfortunate
results in the sphere of ethics. The moral self, we are told,
belongs to the real world; the everyday self that desires,
perceives and thinks, to the familiar world, which is the
world of things $s they appear. To the everyday self, which
in Kant's philosophy is called the empirical or phenomenal