GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

262
ETHICS
I am trying to make out the case for freedom, in any event
a difficult case, in the clearest and most convincing form
in which I can find it, I shall add that the case with which
I am concerned is the case in which the operations of our
reasons are hampered, the clearness of our vision blurred,
when we are pursuing what Socrates called the Good.
That Man has a Natural Disposition to Pursue and
Revere the Good. Socrates, it will be remembered, 1
held that, if a man perceived the Good, he must pursue
it, and that all wrong-doing, therefore, was a form of
mispcrccption, arising from the fact that we take that to be
good which is not. That this is so in regard to our general
judgments of good may well be the case; for, other
things being equal, we have, as I have already tried to
point out, 1 a natural tendency to value and pursue goodness
as opposed to evil. To adduce again a few of the more
obvious examples of this generalization: for telling the
truth no justification is required, but we always lie in
order to gain a particular end by lying. We lie, in fact, for
a reason, but we tell the truth, when we do tell it, for no
reason at all; other things being equal, to tell the truth is
the natural thing to do. Similarly with honesty; when we
deal fairly with others over matters of property and pay
our just debts, we do these things, if I may so put it, for
their own sake. To quote the philosopher Thomas Reid
(1710-1796): "It may always be expected that they
[mankind] will have some regard to truth and justice,
so far at least as not to swerve from them without temptation."
Thus modes of conduct normally called good are
often regarded as ends in themselves. When, however, we
steal or falsify accounts, we do so in order that we may
achieve some end beyond the activity of falsification, the
end, namely, of securing for ourselves money which would
not otherwise come to us. All men, again, prefer happiness
to unhappiness, think kindness to be better than cruelty,
and consider a good-tempered person more admirable
1 See Chapter II, pp. 46 and 48.
f See Chapter VI, pp. aia, 213.