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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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<strong>THE</strong> SCOPS OF ETHIG3 f6g<br />

give in support of any judgment usually take die form of<br />

saying how or why we came to make it (for example, if<br />

I make a judgment, th<strong>at</strong> there will be a European<br />

war sometime during the next twenty years, and somebody<br />

asks me to defend the judgment, I shall adduce<br />

reasons for my judgment derived from a study of recent<br />

history, or an analysis of the contemporary intern<strong>at</strong>ional<br />

Situ<strong>at</strong>ion) there is very little th<strong>at</strong> I can say about my<br />

judgment, this curtain is red. I cannot say why I think<br />

the curtain red, how I came to make the judgment, or<br />

wh<strong>at</strong> are my reasons for thinking it to be true.<br />

We are, it is said, in a similar case in regard to the ultim<strong>at</strong>e<br />

judgments of value which underlie any st<strong>at</strong>ement of an<br />

ethical character. Are such st<strong>at</strong>ements, then, and are the<br />

judgments which underlie them lintrue? It does not follow<br />

th<strong>at</strong> they are; for in the case of many things, which<br />

we know to be true, we can give no reasons for our knowledge.<br />

As I have just pointed out, we can know th<strong>at</strong> the<br />

proposition "this curtain is red " is true, without being able<br />

to give reasons for it, and in just the same way it may<br />

be the case th<strong>at</strong> when we know th<strong>at</strong> the proposition* 'cruelty<br />

is evil" is true, we cannot give reasons for our knowledge.<br />

But because the reasons for such judgments are non-<br />

existent, or, if they exist, incommunicable, it does not<br />

follow th<strong>at</strong> the judgments are meaningless, or th<strong>at</strong><br />

their meaning is not understood. Whether it is understood<br />

or not, depends upon whether the person to whom<br />

the judgment is addressed has <strong>at</strong> any time shared the<br />

experience which induced the person judging to make it.<br />

Let me cite another analogy: we will suppose th<strong>at</strong> I<br />

have the toothache, but th<strong>at</strong> you have never had it Wh<strong>at</strong><br />

will be the effect upon you of my communic<strong>at</strong>ion, "I<br />

have the toothache"? You will no doubt understand with<br />

your reason th<strong>at</strong> I am sufferingsome kind of pain, although,<br />

if you had never experienced pain of any kind, even the<br />

thought, "he is suffering pain", would for you be largely<br />

devoid of meaning. But if, although you had had some<br />

pain you had never had the toothache, then die meaning<br />

Fi

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