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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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5OO ,<br />

POLITICS<br />

all the members of the St<strong>at</strong>e, in their rel<strong>at</strong>ion to one another<br />

and to it, the rule of wh<strong>at</strong> is just or unjust<br />

Criticism of the Concept<br />

of the General Will<br />

(1) THAT IT is INCONSISTENT WITH ROUSSEAU'S<br />

EGOISM. Rousseau's doctrine is, it is obvious, exceed*<br />

ingly confusing. Moreover, in wh<strong>at</strong>ever form we choose to<br />

st<strong>at</strong>e it, it is open to serious objections. One of the most<br />

important of these has already* been urged in various forms<br />

in criticism of subjectivist theories of ethics. Briefly,,<br />

it is<br />

to the effect th<strong>at</strong>, if the n<strong>at</strong>ure of man is fundamentally<br />

egoistical, and if his desires are exclusively hedonistic<br />

and Rousseau, as we have seen, has recourse to the ex-<br />

plan<strong>at</strong>ion of human n<strong>at</strong>ure in terms of its origins, 1<br />

insisting<br />

th<strong>at</strong> in a st<strong>at</strong>e of n<strong>at</strong>ure man is both egoistic and hedonistic<br />

it is impossible to account for the existence of man's<br />

altruistic emotions and sentiments in general, and for his<br />

capacity for willing disinterestedly in particular. Yet the<br />

distinction between the Will of All and the General Will<br />

presupposes th<strong>at</strong> he can will disinterestedly, for it presupposes<br />

th<strong>at</strong> human beings can be actu<strong>at</strong>ed by motives other<br />

than th<strong>at</strong> of personal or Sectional advantage and dis-<br />

interestedly desire the common good. I have already<br />

pointed out, both in this chapter and in Chapter I,* th<strong>at</strong><br />

it is impossible to explain the form<strong>at</strong>ion of society, if the<br />

egoistical account of human n<strong>at</strong>ure in the st<strong>at</strong>e of n<strong>at</strong>ure<br />

is true. I now add th<strong>at</strong> on this assumption it would be<br />

equally impossible to account for the continuance of<br />

society, for the continued functioning of society implies<br />

th<strong>at</strong> people can sometimes will disinterestedly and do<br />

sometimes care for the common good.<br />

(2) THAT IT is INCOMPATIBLE WITH <strong>THE</strong><br />

<strong>THE</strong>ORY OP <strong>THE</strong> SOCIAL CONTRACT. A further<br />

question which arises in this connection is the rel<strong>at</strong>ion of<br />

'See Chapter I 9 pp. 08-30.<br />

See pp. 478, 479 above mod Chapter I, p. 36.

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