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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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226 ETHICS<br />

always disagreeable to him. A good man is one who acts as<br />

he ought to do; he does his duty. Must he always dislike it?<br />

And ifhe does always dislike it, can he be really good ? These<br />

questions are exceedingly awkward for supporters of Kant's<br />

theory. Goodness cannot always be easy to us, and he who<br />

never experiences the tempt<strong>at</strong>ion to do wh<strong>at</strong> he thinks he<br />

ought not to do, or, to put the point the other way round,<br />

never thinks th<strong>at</strong> he ought not to do wh<strong>at</strong> he wants to do, is,<br />

I imagine, either more or less than a man; more, because<br />

to be above tempt<strong>at</strong>ion is to particip<strong>at</strong>e in the Divine,<br />

less, inasmuch as, his moral sense being inadequ<strong>at</strong>ely<br />

developed, he falls short of the full human st<strong>at</strong>ure.<br />

Animals, presumably, rarely, if ever, experience the<br />

conflict between duty and desire, not because they are<br />

without desire, but because they are without the sense<br />

of duty.<br />

But to admit th<strong>at</strong> our duty must sometimes run counter<br />

to our inclin<strong>at</strong>ions, is not to say th<strong>at</strong> it must always do so;<br />

and, in criticism of Kant's view, we are entitled to invoke<br />

a mass of human testimony to the effect th<strong>at</strong> the good<br />

man is one who n<strong>at</strong>urally and spontaneously does wh<strong>at</strong><br />

he ought to do. Unselfishness, for example, is not always<br />

unpleasant to the "reHfih person; it is often displayed<br />

and* i*T>hf*gitfltJTigly by those to whom unselfish<br />

actions are n<strong>at</strong>ural and habitual. They act unselfishly,<br />

in fact, because they are unselfish persons, and,<br />

since unselfish action is in accordance with their n<strong>at</strong>ures,<br />

we cannot suppose it to be n<strong>at</strong>urally disagreeable to them.<br />

The Paradox of Ethics.<br />

(a) THAT VIRTUE MUST BE NATURAL* Having reached<br />

this point in our reflections, we find ourselves in sight<br />

of one of the paradoxes of human conduct. The perfectly<br />

good man might, one -would suppose, be defined as one<br />

who habitually and unhesit<strong>at</strong>ingly does wh<strong>at</strong> is right.<br />

For the perfectly good man is not, one would have said,<br />

a man who, by taking continual thought for his virtue,<br />

by being constantly on his guard against tempt<strong>at</strong>ion,

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