GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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ETHICS
common with others, be represented by the dctenninist
not as the expressions of a freely acting will, but as the
determined resultants of the interaction of a number of
factors over which the will has no control; it can even
be shown that the will is itself one of these factors. But
primn facie it is much harder to apply the explanation of
choice of action in terms of origins to a man's decision to
move his knight rather than his bishop than it is to his
preference for a blonde over a brunette; much harder to
show that his decision to take the left fork is determined
by his physiological constitution, than it is to ascribe to
physiological factors his preference for treacle toffee over
marzipan. If, then, the fact offreedom is to be demonstrated
in any sphere, the demonstration will be easiest in relation
to those choices which would be normally said to be pre-
dominantly rational.
Free Will in Relation to Moral Choice. Most
writers on ethics have held that moral choices are of this
character. The position, then, which I have been outlining,
namely, that the will is on occasion determined by nothing
but an impartial judgment of the lightness or reasonableness
of a particular line of action, is one which most moral
philosophers have been disposed to adopt. On what grounds
have they supported it? Or, to put again the question
formulated above, how have they sought to show that
what is called thought can motivate our actions? No very
convincing argument has ever been brought forward in
favour of this position. The issue, as I have already pointed
out, is one in regard to which proof is not possible. What
the philosophers have done is what, on a previous page,
I suggested that the reader should do, they have looked
into their own consciousnesses and reported that, as Henry
"
Sidgwick (1838-1900) puts it, the perception or judgment
that an act IB per st the right and reasonable act to be done
is an adequate motive to perform it".
Having looked into my own consciousness, I feel that I
can subscribe to Sidgwick's affirmation; I believe, that is