GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

OBJECTIVE INTUITIONI1M
as they appear, and is tx typothesi therefore, something
other than moral obligation and the moral law which
obligation recognizes.
Nevertheless, the sense of moral obligation is a feet, a
fact which, Kant has tried to show, derives its authority
from the real world, the corollary being that, in virtue
of our ability to recognize its promptings and obey its
commands, we, in respect of our moral selves, own mem*
bership
of that world.
Such, in outline, is Kant's theory of morals* Its strength
lies in the distinction which we do undoubtedly make
between is and ought; between what is the case and what
ought to be. In the world that we know by means of the
senses and the intellect we can only, Kant asserts, find fact.
Such a world cannot, then, contain a basis for die notion
of ought; yet we do undoubtedly recognize "oughts".
Therefore, the source of these "oughts" must lie in some
world other than that revealed to the semes and known by
the intellect, and it must be by means of a unique faculty
that we recognize them. This faculty, which Kant calls " the
moral will," not only recognizes, but feels an obligation to
act in accordance with the dictates of the "ought" which
it recognizes. The obligation, however, though it is always
open to us to give heed to it, is never compulsory; for not
only is the moral will free in respect of its deliverances, but
we are free to obey it or not as we please.
What the Moral Will Prescribes. So fer, we have
learnt only that we ought to act in the way which the
moral will prescribes. Can we give any indication of what
it does prescribe? Kant held that we could. What the
moral will prescribes is that we should act in every case
upon general principles which are intuitively recognized
to be morally binding. These general principles are of the
kind which every man acknowledges irrespective of his
needs and circumstances; for example, that lying is wrong,
that promises should be kept, that kindness is better than
cruelty, honesty better than deceit, and so forth.