GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

A THEORY OF GOOD OR VALUE
that, other things being equal, we do what we think to
be right and pursue what we think to be good without
ulterior motive. When, however, we do what we know
to be wrong, there is always an ulterior motive: we do
wrong, that is to say, to promote a particular object or
to gain a particular end. Secondly, there is the argument
that evil is parasitic upon good 1 in the sense that it is only
because most people do, on the whole, act rightly and try
to do their duty, that it pays some people to act wrongly.
Thus lying only pays some people because most people
tell the truth most of the time. The conclusion that moral
virtue is valued and pursued for its own sake will apply,
mutatis mutandis, to other forms of value, for example, to
truth and beauty.
(6) Conclusion that the Motive to Act Rightly is
Not Irrational.
This conclusion was reached in the course of the
discussion of free will in Chapter VII. I there sought
to show that the perception that a certain course of action
is right and reasonable constitutes for the virtuous man an
adequate ground for performing the action. This conclusion
was based upon the premise that, when we pursue what
is good and try to do what is right, the state of consciousness
involved is not one of unmixed feeling or desire, but
contains an element of reason. If it did not, it would not,
I argued, be possible to maintain the existence of moral
freedom.
If this conclusion is correct, the fact that we cannot give
reasons for desiring "the Good" does not entitle us to
conclude that the desire for it is unreasonable. Just as the
perception that a thing is beautiful, or that a proposition
is true is one which in the last resort we ace unable to
justify or support by reason, so we cannot by reason justify
or support our perception that so and so ought to be
done. So much must be admitted. I might add that in
not being demonstrable by reason our perceptions of
1 See Chapter I, pp. 39, 40 and Chapter VI, pp. ao8, 209.