GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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ETHIG8
which we expect to be characterized by a pleasurable
hedonic tone. This analysis can be applied to those pleasures
which Plato describes as'pure, no less than those which he
regarded as impure. It suggests that not even in the case
action such as
of the pure pleasures is the motive for my
Psychological Hedonism asserts. It suggests that, when I
enjoy smelling a violet, I am not enjoying a pleasure, but am
enjoying a specific, cognitive, experience, the " knowing."
of a violet, which I may have deliberately aimed at, which
happens to have a pleasant hedonic quality. The conclusion
of this psychological analysis is that it is never the
case that the motive of an action is solely the wish to
obtain pleasure for the agent. The motives of those actions
which constitute the most plausible illustration of the
hedonist's contentions will be motives to have certain
specific experiences, which are distinguishable from all
other experiences in respect of their non-hedonic qualities,
but which share with them the common quality of being
characterized by a marked degree of pleasant hedonic
tone.
For the reasons given, I conclude that there is no good
ground for supposing that pleasure, or that pleasant
states of consciousness, or that pleasant mental events,
are the only possible objects of human desire, and that
the wish to have them is the only possible motive of
human action.
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C. Statement and Criticism of Ethical Hedonism
THAT ETHICAL HEDONISM is NOT CAPABLE OF
LOGICAL DEMONSTRATION 'OR DISPROOF. There
remains for consideration the view that, although I can
desire things other than our own pleasure, I ought only
tp desire pleasure, .since pleasure is the Good. This view,
which may Ije entitled Ethical Hedonism, since it introduces
the word "ought" has two forms, (a) that I ought
onjy to desire my own pleasure since my pleasure is
the sole good, or is the sole good for me, and (b) that I