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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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OBJECTIVE 1NTUITIONISM 195<br />

habitually use such words as "right" and "duty", and th<strong>at</strong><br />

these words have a meaning for us. Moreover, we are<br />

enabled by reflection to distinguish the meaning of these<br />

words from th<strong>at</strong> of words whose meaning is allied but<br />

different. For example, we distinguish between a right<br />

action and an expedient action; between a wrong action<br />

and one which was well-intentioned, but whose conse-<br />

quences turned out to be unfortun<strong>at</strong>e; between injuring<br />

a person intentionally and unintentionally* There must,<br />

then, says Butler, be a faculty which recognizes these<br />

meanings and distinguishes these differences, just as there<br />

must be a faculty th<strong>at</strong> of vision which distinguishes<br />

red from blue.<br />

The Notion of Merit or Desert Conscience, as But-<br />

ler describes it, is far removed from the blind, instinctive<br />

faculty whose uncontrolled oper<strong>at</strong>ions are responsible<br />

for so much blame, remorse and mortific<strong>at</strong>ion in ordinary<br />

life. One knows only too well the people who are ready<br />

to invoke the dict<strong>at</strong>es of their "consciences," whenever<br />

they want an excuse for being disagreeable. . . . Butler's<br />

Conscience is a highly reasonable and reflective faculty;<br />

it is prepared to make allowances and to take account<br />

of circumstances. 'For example, when making its judgment<br />

upon the moral worth of actions, Conscience takes account<br />

of merit or desert. Let us suppose, for instance, th<strong>at</strong> we see<br />

A hurting B. Lacking inform<strong>at</strong>ion as to the reason of<br />

A's action, Conscience cannot but feel an instinctive<br />

a final verdict an<br />

disapproval, but before passing<br />

enlightened conscience would insist on all the inform<strong>at</strong>ion<br />

relevant to a judgment of disapproval being available.<br />

Suppose, for example, th<strong>at</strong> B had committed a serious<br />

and unprovoked offence against A; then it might be<br />

thought th<strong>at</strong> B's present sufferings constituted a well-merited<br />

punishment for his unprovoked offence. Because, in other<br />

words, Conscience judges a particular punishment to be<br />

of an action of which in other<br />

merited, it may approve<br />

circumstances it would disapprove.

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