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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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442 .<br />

ETHICS<br />

to which they are reactions. Thus the very view which<br />

insists upon man's wholly n<strong>at</strong>ural origin and die consequent<br />

determin<strong>at</strong>ion of all the processes of his being, mental as<br />

well as physical, by those forces which oper<strong>at</strong>e universally<br />

in the physical world, is precluded by this very insistence<br />

from giving a purely subjectivist account of any of the<br />

expressions of man's n<strong>at</strong>ure, and is precluded, therefore,<br />

from giving a purely subjectivist account of his intuitions<br />

of value. These cannot be quite arbitrary; there must be<br />

somttUng in the physical<br />

universe to account for their<br />

existence, to respond to their intim<strong>at</strong>ions, and to correspond<br />

to their deliverances since, otherwise, it would be impossible<br />

to account for the fact th<strong>at</strong> we do all possess them. For<br />

if man's intuitions are the reflections of nothing wh<strong>at</strong>ever<br />

outside himself, then we must credit him with precisely<br />

th<strong>at</strong> power of spontaneous cre<strong>at</strong>ion which the n<strong>at</strong>uralistic<br />

view denies.<br />

If, however, in spite of the foregoing consider<strong>at</strong>ions it<br />

is still insisted th<strong>at</strong> our intuitions of value are purely<br />

subjective, then, as I have already pointed out in the<br />

chapter on free will, 1 our intuitions of truth will be no<br />

less subjective than our intuitions of other forms of value,<br />

and we shall have no ground on which to claim validity<br />

for any argument. There is, then, no ground for the claim<br />

to validity advanced on behalf of subjectivist arguments.<br />

Th<strong>at</strong> Each Form of Value Manifests Itself in a Specific<br />

Medium. The conclusion of the foregoing is th<strong>at</strong> the<br />

fact th<strong>at</strong> we recognize and respond to value is most<br />

readily explicable on the assumption th<strong>at</strong> value exists and is<br />

objectively real. The question, wh<strong>at</strong> things are recognized<br />

and responded to as being valuable, is, as I have already<br />

suggested, one of fact. To answer it, we must turn to<br />

history and ask wh<strong>at</strong> tilings people have in the past<br />

regarded as valuable in and for themselves, and to<br />

psychology and ask wh<strong>at</strong> things people now regard as<br />

being valuable in and for themselves. I have accepted<br />

See Chapter VII, pp. 273, 274.

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