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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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310<br />

ETHICS<br />

Inevitably, we hear only of the geniuses who "break<br />

"<br />

through" and stamp their thought upon the minds of<br />

men. But for every one who, in spite of opposition, succeeds<br />

in imposing his original inspir<strong>at</strong>ion upon the mind<br />

of the race, there may have been, there probably have been,<br />

a dozen whom opposition has succeeded in stifling.<br />

The conclusion seems to be th<strong>at</strong> the received moral<br />

judgment of any given society cannot be accepted as a true<br />

guide to morality, if only because it is frequently opposed<br />

to wh<strong>at</strong> in the light of history we recognize to have been a<br />

moral advance. 1<br />

Just because received moral opinion<br />

reflects the needs and conduces to the stability of a society,<br />

it is liable to be ranged against change. Yet change there<br />

must be, if there is to be evolution and progress in morality.<br />

Unless, then, we are prepared to accept the view th<strong>at</strong> a<br />

final and ultim<strong>at</strong>e revel<strong>at</strong>ion of right and wrong has<br />

already been vouchsafed to a particular community,<br />

we cannot but conclude th<strong>at</strong> there are occasions when<br />

the interests of morality are best served by a refusal to abide<br />

by the received standards of the time.<br />

IV. CRITICISM OF INTUITIONIST<br />

AND MORAL SENSE <strong>THE</strong>ORIES<br />

RESUMED<br />

(6) Th<strong>at</strong> if the Moral Sense is Feeling, its Deliverances<br />

are Subjective. To resume the general criticism of<br />

Intuitionism, any view which seeks to base morality<br />

upon feeling is exposed to the objection th<strong>at</strong> the deliverance*<br />

of a moral sense so conceived will have a purely<br />

subjective reference. For feelings, it may be pointed out,<br />

are rel<strong>at</strong>ive and priv<strong>at</strong>e in a sense in which the deliverances<br />

of reason are objective and public. Hence<br />

feelings give no inform<strong>at</strong>ion except about themselves. If<br />

feelings only give inform<strong>at</strong>ion about themselves, informa-<br />

tion, th<strong>at</strong> is to say, to the effect th<strong>at</strong> such and such a feeling<br />

1 This is a point of view which J. S. Mill elabor<strong>at</strong>ed with gre<strong>at</strong> force.<br />

See Chapter XIV, pp. 529-596.

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