GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

A THEORY OF GOOD OR VALUE 46$
I concluded 1 that such an escape from complete determina-
tion was possible, provided that we were prepared to agree
that there was an element of reason in willing, and that
impulse and desire are not the sole springs of our actions.
If reason includes a conativc element, so that it is by
virtue of our reason that we are free to will to act rightly
in spite of the solicitations of passion and impulse, then it
is also by virtue of our reason that we are free to will to
reason better. If, in other words, we are free to do our duty,
we are free also to use our reasons to find out what our
duty is. -And just as the will may be strengthened by
process of freely willing, so the reason may be strengthened
by process of freely reasoning, so that a man can improve
his power of judgment no less than his strength of willing.
To put the point more concretely, I may throughout my
life use a good native intelligence in the investigation of
purely abstract subjects and refuse to apply it to the problems
of conduct, in which case I shall have given myself
no practice in accurately judging the results of my actions.
I may even deliberately abstain from .acquiring the
necessary practice. And the point which I am making is,
first, that it is my duty to apply my reason to the problems
of conduct and, secondly, that I am free to will to do
that it is
my duty in this respect as in others, provided
admitted that the will contains a rational element.
Summary. The foregoing argument is complex and
a summary of its conclusions may be useful. The second
of what I have elsewhere called the two main problems
of ethics, the problem of finding out what our duty is,
turns out on analysis to be the problem of correctly estimating
the probable consequences of our actions. This is a
problem of rational calculation. The full conception of
moral virtue entails, then, a certain element of accurate
reasoning as well as the more obvious elements of strength of
will and virtuous motive ; andit entails an element ofaccurate
reasoning because we require to know what our duty is,
1 Sec Chapter VII, pp. 967-971.