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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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NATURE OF <strong>THE</strong> MORAL FACULTY 299<br />

be likely to produce unhappiness <strong>at</strong> the time of the passing<br />

of the judgment of moral approval upon them, affords a<br />

strong presumption for rejecting a theory which insists<br />

th<strong>at</strong> the passing of a judgment of approval by the moral<br />

sense is in itself a sufficient criterion of the morality of<br />

an action. One further objection remains to be noted. It<br />

often happens th<strong>at</strong> when the moral sense of a particular<br />

person has approved of an action and declared it to be<br />

right, the moral sense of the same person or persons<br />

presently disapproves of the consequences of the action<br />

on the ground th<strong>at</strong> they are bad. Now the fact of one<br />

of an<br />

judgment being passed about the consequences<br />

action while a contrary judgment is passed about the<br />

action itself, taken iir conjunction with the difficulty<br />

to divorce an action from its conse-<br />

<strong>at</strong>tending the <strong>at</strong>tempt<br />

quences, forces us to the conclusion th<strong>at</strong> the same wholes,<br />

wholes, th<strong>at</strong> is to say, which include both actions and<br />

consequences, are being <strong>at</strong> the same time made the objects<br />

of judgments of approval and of disapproval by the moral<br />

sense, and are, therefore, <strong>at</strong> the same time both right and<br />

wrong, good and bad. This conclusion must surely be<br />

false. The fact th<strong>at</strong> it is logically entailed by the position<br />

under consider<strong>at</strong>ion suggests th<strong>at</strong> the mere passing of a<br />

judgment by the moral sense, whether upon an action or<br />

its consequences, is not in itself sufficient to establish the<br />

lightness or wrongness<br />

of the action.<br />

(5) Th<strong>at</strong> some Moral Judgments are Trivial and<br />

Frivolous.<br />

I have spoken so far of those judgments of the moral<br />

sense which may be impugned on the ground th<strong>at</strong> they are<br />

self-contradictory or are deleterious to happiness. Other<br />

judgments are open to criticism on the ground th<strong>at</strong> they<br />

are arbitrary, trivial or ludicrous. Thus our Victorian<br />

. pianos<br />

ancestors insisted on sw<strong>at</strong>hing the legs of their grand<br />

on the ground th<strong>at</strong>, being legs, they were necessarily<br />

indecent The monks on Mount Athos carried the<br />

early Christian prejudice against the female sex to such

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