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ETHICI
igs
demamb that I should not reveal the whereabouts of the
store of food to my companions, while Benevolence would,
I imagine, dictate the contrary course. Indeed, it may be
said (bit, since to reveal the store of food would mean the
death ofall of us, the amount being inadequate to maintain
four persons, whfle its secret consumption by myself would
preserve my own life, die obligation which 1 am under
to promote the greatest amount of happiness on the
whole, an obligation which the utilitarians were subse-
quently to invoke, 1 demands that I should keep the
knowledge of the food to myself for, in addition to
surviving, I may quite possibly live happily ever after.
It may be doubted, moreover, whether in a society of
persons completely devoid of Benevolence, Benevolence
would ever pay, for Benevolence by A only leads to the
gratification of A's Self-love because and in so far as it
tends to provoke 'a return in kind from its objects. As the
mystics would put it, the way to make people lovable is
to love them.
But, as Butler points out, the motives of most people
ait mixed; acting neither from pure Self-love nor from
pure Benevolence, they can usually be relied upon to
repay benevolent conduct in others by benevolent conduct
on their own part Thus it is a good general rule that in
a normal society a benevolent action conduces to the
advantage of the agent
That Happiness and Virtue often Coincide. Two
deductions of interest may be drawn. The first is that, if
people would act benevolently more often than they do,
the would would be a happier place; happier not only
because of die benefits conferred by Benevolence upon its
objects, but also because of the benefits which benevolent
conduct brings to its agent. People, in other words, would
have a better time, if they would only consent to be more
virtuous. As with individuals, so with nations. Many
nations in pursuit of what they believe to be self-interest
1 See Chapter IX, pp. 332-336-