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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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208 ETHICS<br />

Nor are they in any way opposed to reason. On the<br />

contrary, ifwe investig<strong>at</strong>e the deliverances ofour moral wills<br />

by means of reason, we realize th<strong>at</strong> the general principles<br />

which the will prescribes are the only ones which are not<br />

self-contradictory. There is, for example, no contradiction<br />

inherent in the precept th<strong>at</strong> everybody should tell the truth;<br />

but if everybody were to lie, nobody would believe any*<br />

body else, and there would be no point, therefore, in lying.<br />

This is wh<strong>at</strong> Kant incans by saying th<strong>at</strong> wrong conduct<br />

is self-contradictory; it cannot be universalized without<br />

stultifying itself. /Hence Kant's famous precept: "Act<br />

only according to th<strong>at</strong> maxim which you can a* the same<br />

time will to be a universal law."<br />

Evil Parasitic upon Good Kant is here emphasizing<br />

an important truth. All wrong action, as I have had<br />

occasion to point out in another connection, 1 is parasitic,<br />

parasitic, th<strong>at</strong> is to say, upon right action. Consider, for<br />

example, the above-mentioned case of lying. Lying, I<br />

pointed out in the earlier discussion, is only profitable to<br />

some people because most people tell the truth. For the<br />

object of the liar is to get credence for his st<strong>at</strong>ement; the<br />

extent to which he will succeed in doing this depends upon<br />

the amount of credence which people habitually give to<br />

the st<strong>at</strong>ements made to them, and this in its turn will<br />

depend upon the general amount of truth-telling in the<br />

community. Thus the more frequently most people tell the<br />

truth, the more profitable does lying become for the few<br />

who do not. Similarly with honesty: if everybody were<br />

dishonest, nobody would trust anybody else and dishonesty,<br />

which depends for its success upon people's willingness to<br />

trust their fellows, would cease to pay. Dishonesty, in<br />

short, only pays the few, when it does pay them, because<br />

the many are habitually honest The case of theft illustr<strong>at</strong>es<br />

the same truth. If everybody were a burglar, there would<br />

be nothing to steal, and the occup<strong>at</strong>ion of burgling would<br />

therefore, cease to be profitable. It is only because most<br />

1 See die discuwion in Chapter I, pp. 39, 40.

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