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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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NATURE OF <strong>THE</strong> MORAL FACULTY 3!!<br />

is being entertained, they do not give inform<strong>at</strong>ion about<br />

the n<strong>at</strong>ure of those things external to themselves which<br />

they purport to report. In other words, feelings<br />

are not<br />

objective in their reference. On a previous page 1 1 elabor<strong>at</strong>ed<br />

in some detail the distinction between subjective<br />

and objective judgments, and pointed out th<strong>at</strong> many<br />

judgments, particularly judgments of taste and feeling,<br />

which are objective in appearance, are, nevertheless,<br />

subjective in fact, since they only succeed in giving<br />

inform<strong>at</strong>ion about events occurring in the mind of the<br />

subject judging. But while feeling judgments are by their<br />

very n<strong>at</strong>ure subjective in the sense defined, the judgments<br />

of reason can always claim to be objective, even when<br />

they are wrong. Feeling judgments, in other words, only<br />

report the feelings of the judger and convey no inform<strong>at</strong>ion<br />

about anything external to the judger; judgments of<br />

reason do convey such inform<strong>at</strong>ion, or, <strong>at</strong> least, they may<br />

do so. Thus, if I say th<strong>at</strong> 3 plus a equals 5, I am making<br />

a st<strong>at</strong>ement whose truth is apprehended by reason, and,<br />

provided th<strong>at</strong> you are a normal human. being possessed<br />

of a reason, I can not only convey to you the truth expressed<br />

by my judgment, but I can cause you to see th<strong>at</strong><br />

it is true. When you see th<strong>at</strong> it is true, you will have the<br />

same experience as I am having when I see it If, however,<br />

when suffering from toothache I announce th<strong>at</strong> my pain<br />

has a peculiar and distinctive quality, then all th<strong>at</strong> I<br />

am conveying is th<strong>at</strong> 1 am experiencing painful sens<strong>at</strong>ions<br />

which are unique but indescribable, and my st<strong>at</strong>ement<br />

will evoke no analogous experience in you. Indeed, unless<br />

you, too, have <strong>at</strong> sometime had toothache, the inform<strong>at</strong>ion<br />

conveyed by my st<strong>at</strong>ement* will have, for you, a purely<br />

formal meaning. You will understand wh<strong>at</strong> I say to the<br />

extent of knowing th<strong>at</strong> I have suffered or am suffering,<br />

but you will not understand wh<strong>at</strong> it is th<strong>at</strong> I have suffered<br />

or am suffering.<br />

In this sense, feeling judgments are priv<strong>at</strong>e, and<br />

report something which has happened or is happening in<br />

1 See Chapter V, pp. 159-163.

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