GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

THB PROBLRM OF FREEWILL 259
series of carefully linked psychological events. These he
has observed and correlated) as he might observe and
correlate facts about crystals or about plants, and having
framed certain formulae on the basis of his observations,
he naturally regards those whom he has been observing
as specimen examples which .obey the formulae. He then,
we must further suppose, remembers that he too is, from
the point of view of others, a specimen example. Therefore,
since he cannot help but admit he is in no way
exceptional, his own acts of will must, he will argue, be
completely caused psychological events falling within the
framework of the formulae which he applies to his fellows.
*
Therefore/ he will conclude, 'the sensations of voluntarfness
which I undoubtedly experience must be illusory.'
Doubts of Efficacy of Scientific Method as applied to
Analysis of Human Beings* In criticism of this mode
of treatment, the advocate of free will will point to die
informs it. "It
unproved assumption which throughout
9
is, he would say, 'a begging of the question from the start,
to assume that the voluntary and purposive acts of human
beings are events in the scientific sense of the word at all.
They are, it is true, events in so far as they are caused and
determined, but only in so far as thy an caustd and
dcttrmintd, and whether they are wholly caused or
determined or not, is precisely the question at issue.
Nevertheless, I find it easy to SCQ why the scientist must
take the line he does, and proceed, as if all events were
determined by the factors which caused them, whether
they are in fact so or not. For science, as I understand it,
seeks to bring the phenomena which it studies under the
aegis of law* In order that it may effect this purpose it
must (a) classify the phenomena with other phenomena
of the same type, and (b) represent them as effects of their
conditioning causes. Classification of phenomena enables
the scientist to predict the behaviour of the unknown X
in the light of his knowledge of that of the known Y.
Ability to represent phenomena* as effects enables him