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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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BTRIQi<br />

rules, th<strong>at</strong> they should apply equally to everybody. We are<br />

all, in short, equal before the moral law. It is no excuse,<br />

he holds, for breaking it, to say th<strong>at</strong> one is '/specially<br />

circumstanced" or "peculiarly tempted". One has to a*k<br />

oneself, wh<strong>at</strong> would be the effect if everybody were to<br />

make similar excuses on his own behalf? Thus it is a<br />

sign of moral conduct th<strong>at</strong> it can be universalized, th<strong>at</strong> is,<br />

observed by everybody without producing an impossible<br />

situ<strong>at</strong>ion; it is a sign of immoral conduct th<strong>at</strong> it cannot,<br />

Th<strong>at</strong> People should be tre<strong>at</strong>ed as Ends, never merely as<br />

Means. A further maxim which Kant deduces from<br />

the n<strong>at</strong>ure of the moral law is the following: "Act so th<strong>at</strong><br />

you tre<strong>at</strong> humanity, in your own person and in the person<br />

of everyone else, always as an end as well as a means,<br />

never merely as a means." In virtue of their possession<br />

of a moral faculty, human beings are, as we have seen,<br />

particip<strong>at</strong>ors in reality; they are, th<strong>at</strong> is to say, from<br />

Kant's point of view, "ends in themselves". It follows<br />

th<strong>at</strong> we are never justified in tre<strong>at</strong>ing them as if they<br />

were merely means to ends beyond themselves, as steppingstones,<br />

for example, in a career prompted by ambition,<br />

as instruments for the s<strong>at</strong>isfaction of sexual desire, or as<br />

objects for the gr<strong>at</strong>ific<strong>at</strong>ion of sadistic instincts. To take<br />

vengeance on a person for one's own s<strong>at</strong>isfaction, or to<br />

waste a life<br />

person's in ministering to one's own comfort,<br />

is to use th<strong>at</strong> person as a means to an end beyond himself.<br />

But, Kant insists, there is no end which can justify such a<br />

subordin<strong>at</strong>ion, for there is no end th<strong>at</strong> is ultim<strong>at</strong>ely and<br />

absolutely valuable save moral worth, and it is moral<br />

worth which is impaired when a person is tre<strong>at</strong>ed otherwise<br />

than as an end. The St<strong>at</strong>e, then, is never justified<br />

in tre<strong>at</strong>ing a citizen solely as the instrument of its pur-<br />

poses. 1<br />

Strength<br />

of Kant's Position. Kant's insistence on the<br />

absolute character of the moral imper<strong>at</strong>ive is apt to sound<br />

1 See Chapter XIX, pp. 805-806, for *n expansion of thif st<strong>at</strong>ement.

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