GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

OBJECTIVE UTILITARIANISM 345
although he also held that actions proceeding from
enlightened selfishness and actions prompted by benevolence
were more often identical than was generally supposed.
But, by postulating an over-riding principle of Conscience,
he provided machinery for resolving die conflict. 1
Utilitarianism, while in the last resort it relies no less
freely on intuitions than the contrary 4ctrine, refrains
as far as possible from admitting the fact, and, when it
is forced to mention it, does so only with the greatest
circumspection. It is from this unwillingness to admit
the intuitional basis upon which Utilitarianism rests, that
there proceed such unconvincing arguments as that which
is designed to show that the general and individual good
do not really conflict, or that, in promoting the greatest
happiness of the greatest number, I am also promoting
my own greatest pleasure. If we remain unconvinced by
these arguments, we are confronted with the question,
how are we to decide between the deliverances of the
practical reason, I ought to maximize my own good, and
I ought to maximize that of other people? If we are
prepared to accept the authority of Butler's conscience,
the decision is made for us, but then we shall also be
committed to accepting his view that conscience derives
its authority from another world, and that it is by
reference to God's will that the problem of conduct is
in the last resort to be solved. Unless we are prepared
to follow Butler's arguments into the next world in order
to resolve the puzzles of this one, there can, it would
seem, be no way of deciding the conflict between these
two intuitions except by invoking another.
Once the necessity for admitting intuitions is frankly
faced, the question arises whether we must not extend
their operation more widely than even Sidgwick would
be prepared to allow. Most utilitarians would be willing,
if pressed, to agree that the assertion, pleasure is a good,
is based on an intuition, but is there, it may bt asked,
an intuition to the effect that pleasure is the sol* good?
1 See Chapter VI, pp. 196-901.