GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

11O ETHICS AND POLITICS: THE GREEKS
the slept by means of which this result mmy be obtained.
We picture to ourselves the result, the steps which will
bring it about, and then the steps leading to the steps
which will bring it about until, as we trace back the chain
of steps, we come at last to one that Iks within our power.
This we proceed to take, not because we desire it for its
own sake, but because we desire the end-result of the
chain of actions which it initiates. It is with reference to this
first step that Aristotle defines the will as the deliberate
or self-conscious choosing of something which it is within
our power to do.
We were led to embark upon an account of Aristotle's
doctrine of the will in the expectation that it might
modify the somewhat automatic view of human conduct, or
at least of the conduct of the ordinary man, to which his
theory of the two levels of morality appeared to point.
Judged from this point of view, the doctrine of the will
is deficient in two respects.
Reason as the Servant of Desire. i. The first is in
respect of its view of reason* The relation between reason
and desire in Aristotle's Ethics is a subject of controversy.
Aristotle often writes, as if he conceived reason to be
merely the servant of desire. He lays it down, for
example, that "mm thinking originates
no movement".
This statement is usually interpreted to mean that reason
does not itself initiate action, but only comes into play
when the motive force of desire sets it going. The controversy
is apt to be unfruitful, since our view of the matter
at issue must depend upon the precise sense in which
the word "reason" is being used. Aristotle is here making
a distinction between the theoretical and the practical
reason, and it is only of the former that he asserts that it
does not motivate action. He certainly did not wish to
deny the presence of a rational element in choice. Yet the
whole tenor of his doctrine of the will is undoubtedly
detcrminist. The conclusions of his determinism will be
familiar to students of modern psychology. Many modern