GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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Motives, as I remarked above, are usually mixed, and
die prompting of many actions probably owes something
to both principles^ What is more, it is often difficult to
distinguish actions dictated by one or other of the two
principles from those prompted by the particular impulses.
The practical corollary of this difficulty of determining the
nature of motives is, presumably, tolerance, for, where
the motives by which people are actuated remain doubtful,
it is charitable to give them the benefit of the doubt
Conscience. Hie original purpose of this account of
Butler's philosophy was, it will be remembered, to provide
an illustration of the type of ethical theory known as
Objective-Intuitionism. It is by reason of his treatment of
i that Butler qualifies as an objective-intuitionist.
Conscience is, for Butler, the supreme faculty which, in
a properly regulated nature, is in control of all the others*
Just as Self-love and Benevolence are in authority over
the particular impulses and determine to what extent
they may be gratified, so Conscience is in authority over
both Self-love, and Benevolence. Butler treats Conscience
under two aspects, the cognitive, or knowing, and the
authoritative or prescribing* The cognitive aspect of
Conscience expresses itself in reflecting and judging*
Conscience, that is to say, reflects upon and judges the
characters and motives of human bongs, but its reflections
and judgments are informed by a particular kind of
interest It is interested in characters, actions and motives
not for themselves, but only in so far as they can appropriately
be made the objects of moral judgment; in so
far, in other words, as they are capable of being judged to
be right or wrong. Many actions, for example the action
of extracting from a full box of matches the match which
is next but three from the tefthand side of the box in the
top row, are, Butler would agree, ethically neutral and in
them Conscience has no interest*
What are the grounds for postulating the existence
of such a faculty? Butler's main ground is that we do