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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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<strong>THE</strong> PROBLEM OF FREE WILL 2*7<br />

least they are not notably inferior to those of non*<br />

determinists: indeed, it is open to question whether the<br />

belief th<strong>at</strong> one's acts are determined makes any difference<br />

<strong>at</strong> all to one's conduct<br />

In spite of these consider<strong>at</strong>ions, it is plain,<br />

<strong>at</strong> least to<br />

the present writer, th<strong>at</strong> the validity of ethics is incomp<strong>at</strong>ible<br />

with the denial of free will in any of the senses<br />

in which th<strong>at</strong> term is ordinarily used, and th<strong>at</strong>, conversely,<br />

Kant is right in saying th<strong>at</strong> "ought" implies "can".<br />

If determinism is a fact, we are not responsible<br />

for our<br />

actions. Hence reproof is as impertinent as praise is<br />

irr<strong>at</strong>ional: nor does it alter the case th<strong>at</strong> the reproving<br />

and the praising are beyond the control of the reprover<br />

and the pxaiser. Now ethics is a structure which is built<br />

on the twin pillars of praise and blame. If you cannot<br />

judge in regard to a man th<strong>at</strong> he ought to do action X,<br />

and approve him for doing, blame him for not doing it,<br />

then there is no ethical judgment which you can vaiidly<br />

pass. Yet if he can only perform action Y, it is surely<br />

nonsense to say th<strong>at</strong> he ought to have performed<br />

action<br />

X, just as it would be nonsense to say of a stone th<strong>at</strong> fell<br />

from the top of a cliff on to the beach below, th<strong>at</strong> it ought<br />

to have fallen upwards into the iky. If, then, there is no<br />

In order th<strong>at</strong><br />

power of choice, ethics is meaningless.<br />

ethics may have meaning, we must <strong>at</strong> least be free to<br />

choose th<strong>at</strong> which appears to us to be good, even if we<br />

are not free in any other way, nor do I think th<strong>at</strong> many<br />

philosophers would dissent from this view*<br />

As regards my second contention, many philosophers<br />

have held th<strong>at</strong> reason can neither determine choice nor<br />

motiv<strong>at</strong>e action. I shall try to show th<strong>at</strong>, if they are right<br />

in holding this view, die task of maintaining free will,<br />

in any event a difficult one, becomes impossible.<br />

I. <strong>THE</strong> CASE AGAINST FREE WILL<br />

Hie task is, I rfcpe<strong>at</strong> in any event a difficult one and, the<br />

more closely one looks into the question, the more difficult

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