GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

358
' ETHICS
completely my individual self, is pleasant Whatever
thwarts this endeavour is painful. Thus what I call
good is identified with that which gives me pleasure.
Spinoza's Ethical Conclusions and Account of Origins of
Moral Ideas. Though its principles are no less egoistic,
Spinoza's system of ethics is altogether more dynamic than
that of Hobbcs. While, for Hobbes, the good is that which
tends to iny preservation and the object of my endeavour
is to remain what I am, for Spinoza the good is whatever
tends to the enhancement of my individuality,
and the
object of my endeavour is to achieve greater abundance
and distinctivencss of being. Spinoza, like Hobbes, thinks
of the individual's welfare very largely in physiological
terms. The first endeavour of the mind is, he holds, to
affirm the existence of the body, and it is in die enrichment
of bodily life by the satisfaction of the body's needs, by
the development of the body's capacities and by the
enhancement of its powers of action, that the good for the
individual consists.
Spinoza's practical conclusions are the reverse of ascetic.
It is, indeed, difficult to see how any subjectivist system of
ethics can subscribe to the admonition to mortify the
flesh. If the good is that which I enjoy, the more the
enjoyment, the greater, it is obvious, the good. The
practical bearing of almost all subjectivist systems of ethics
has, therefore, been Epicurean and Spinoza's is no exception.
Eating, drinking, the pleasures of the senses, the
beauty of nature, sport,
art and the drama all these are
prescribed to keep the body in good condition, so that it
may be in a position to perform whatever functions are
appropriate to its nature. Such, for Spinoza! is the outline
of the "good "life.
The word "good" is, however, rightly printed in
quotation marks, for strictly speaking Spinoza recognizes
no good* The universe as a whole is for him neither good
nor bad; it just is. Good, then, can have meaning only
in relation to those finite individuals who are the partial