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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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290<br />

ETHICS<br />

obtain money to feed a starving family, than we should do,<br />

if the forger's object were merely to obtain increased<br />

opportunities for the gr<strong>at</strong>ific<strong>at</strong>ion of his senses and appetites.<br />

Consider<strong>at</strong>ions of motive, then, affect our judgments<br />

of actions.<br />

Wh<strong>at</strong>, then, is a motive? A motive may plausibly be<br />

analysed into an act of will coupled with a judgment of<br />

expected consequences. I will, in other words, to do so and<br />

so because I expect such and such consequences to result<br />

from my doing so and so, and wish to bring these conse-<br />

quences about. Now the act of will, the expect<strong>at</strong>ion<br />

and the wish are all psychological events; they all occur<br />

in my mind. How events in the mind are transformed into<br />

bodily acts we do not know, since the n<strong>at</strong>ure of the rel<strong>at</strong>ion<br />

between mind and body is itself unknown. Unless,<br />

however, we adopt a m<strong>at</strong>erialist philosophy, in which<br />

case, as I tried to show in the last chapter, the study of<br />

ethics may be dismissed as irrelevant, 1 we shall be justified<br />

in saying th<strong>at</strong> acts of will do in some sense cause bodily<br />

movements. It is because, to take an example, I have first<br />

resolved to raise my left arm, th<strong>at</strong> certain movements occur<br />

in the nerve cells ofmy brain; these cause other movements<br />

in the motor nervous system wtych governs the movements<br />

ofmy limbs and, as a consequence, my left arm raises itself<br />

in the air.<br />

Willing and acting, therefore, are not two separ<strong>at</strong>e<br />

events; they resolve themselves on analysis into a chain of<br />

causally linked movements, each movement in the chain<br />

being die effect of the preceding movement and the cause<br />

of the succeeding, the earlier movements in the chain being<br />

called psychological and the l<strong>at</strong>er physiological. Now the<br />

earlier movements in the chain were those which we identi-<br />

fied with wh<strong>at</strong> is commonly called motive. The conclusion<br />

seems to be as follows: the <strong>at</strong>tempt to draw a line <strong>at</strong> some<br />

point across the chain with the object of consigning the<br />

events th<strong>at</strong> fall on one side of the line to the c<strong>at</strong>egory of<br />

wh<strong>at</strong> is called the motive, and those upon the other to the<br />

1 See Chapter VII, p. 297.

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