GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

454
ETHICS
the term evil with something else X in this case is "the
absence or limitation of what is good" , and falls under
the criticism stated in (Hi) above.
This particular view contains, however, a latent implica-
tion which is worth disentangling. The implication is
that good and evil are opposites, and opposites of such a
kind that the presence of the one means or is equivalent
to the absence of the other. This, at least, is thought to be
true ofthe absence of good, although I do not know whether
some people would also be prepared to maintain that good
is or is equivalent to the absence of evil.
There seems to be no reason to suppose that good and
^vil are opposites of this kind. In order that it may be seen
that they are not, it is necessary to make a distinction
between types of opposites. There are opposites such that
the presence of the one involves the absence of the other.
The opposites "emptiness" and "fulness" are examples
of this type; in proportion as a container is not full, in
precisely that same proportion is it empty. The same may
be said of the opposites "dryness" and "wetness". But
there is another type of so-called opposites such that the
absence of the one does not entail the presence of the
other. Black and white axe usually regarded as opposites;
yet it is not true that, if a thing is not white, it must be
black; it may be red. Nor is it even true that, in proportion
as white is absent from it, black must be present in it.
Now it seems to me that the "oppositeness" which good
and evil exemplify is of this latter type. I can see no reason
whatever for holding either that a thing must be good or
evil, or that, in proportion as good is absent from it, evil
must be present in it. Many things and most actions seem
to be ethically neutral. It seems fantastic to assert of such
an action as that of moving one finger of my left hand
an inch to the right of this paper upon which I am writing
with my right hand, that it is either good or bad. But if it
is possible for good to be absent without evil being in any
way involved by its absence, it follows that evil does not
mean the absence or limitation of good.