GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

NATURE OF THE MORAL FACULTY 1295
good, but the actual consequences are bad, then the
intuitionist would still approve of the action, provided
that the agent could, in the light of the data at his disposal,
be considered to be reasonably entitled to expect good
consequences to accrue from it. This insistence upon
intended consequences affords a dear line of demarcation
between any form of Intuitionism and the utilitarian view
of ethics to be considered in the next chapter which
regards the actual consequences, whether intended or not,
as those which are relevant to our estimation of the moral
worth of actions*
(3) That the Deliverances of the Moral Sense
Arbitrary, Changing and Inconsistent.
are
To resume our criticism of Intuitionism, the strongest
and the most frequently urged objection to intuitionist
theories directs attention to the nature of the deliver-
ances of the moral sense. They are, it is pointed out, conflicting,
capricious and arbitrary. They are relative to
time, place and circumstance, and are, it is obvious,
frequently inspired and dictated by non-ethical considera-
tions. Although there may be a kind of vague consensus
of opinion among most people in most periods of the
world's history with regard to certain classes of actions
there is, for example, a fairly general disapproval of
lying there is almost invariably the greatest possible disagreement
between people's intuitions in regard to particular
actions,
As with the moral sense of individuals, so with that of
communities. The moral public opinion of a community
is not only capricious and arbitrary; it is also inconsistent
with the moral public opinion of another community.
Not only does the moral sense of different peoples pass
contradictory judgments upon the same action at the same
time, but die moral sense of the same communities,
instead of being fixed, definite and infallible, as supporters
of the intuitionist theory are inclined to suggest, passes
different judgments upon the same action at different