GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

OBJECTIVE UTILITARIANISM 347
hypothetical martyr no good results of any kind follow. On
the contrary, the results which we are entitled to postulate
are almost certainly such as would normally be called bad,
including, as they do, the sadistic gratification of the
torturers, appalling pain to the torturee, and a convincing
demonstration that ideas can be stamped out by persecution.
Nevertheless, most people would, I think, hold that
the fortitude and resolution of the torturee were morally
praiseworthy, they would, that is to say, pass a judgment
of moral approval upon his state of mind. To generalize
this example, we may say that states of mind are on
occasion morally approved by the popular consciousness
apart from their consequences and, farther,* that a willingness
to do what a man believes to be his duty is thought
to be valuable, even if the consequences are negligible
or bad. Such judgments form part of the common experience
of mankind, and, it might well be said, any moral
theory which fails to make provision for them must, in
respect of its failure, be regarded as faulty.
The Historical Significance of Utilitarianism. If the
foregoing criticisms are valid, Utilitarianism no less than
Intuitionism appears defective as an ethical theory. Each
theory fails to make adequate provision for admitted
facts of moral experience. Intuitionism fails to make
provision for the fact that we do habitually judge by results
and find it difficult to believe that good motives and
good* intentions are enough. Utilitarianism fails to make
provision for the facts, (i)
that some states of mind are
commonly judged to be good independently of actions
and the results of actions, and (2) that intuitions lie at
the basis of all ethical theories including Utilitarianism
if intuitions are to be
itself, with the corollary that,
admitted, the restriction of our intuitional judgments of
value to the judgment that pleasure alone is valuable is
arbitrary.
I shall endeavour in Chapter XII to sketch the outline
of a theory of ethics which, though admittedly very far