GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

A THEO& OF GOOD OR VALUE
do, as I have tried to show, regard certain things as being
valuable in themselves; that we approve of whatever
manifests or exemplifies things which we regard as being
valuable in themselves; and that we only desire and
approve of other things in so far as we think that they will
promote these ultimately valuable things, or, rather, in
so far as they will promote the things which manifest or
exemplify these ultimately valuable things. Thus we hold
that morally virtuous characters are valuable in them*
selves, apart from the actions in which the characters are
expressed, and we approve of whatever tends to promote
moral virtue. We also, I think, consider happy states of
consciousness to be valuable in themselves, and we
approve, therefore, of whatever tends to promote happiness.
Morally virtuous characters and happy states of
consciousness are, therefore, examples or illustrations of
things which we consider to be valuable because they
manifest or exemplify the ultimate values or moral virtue
and happiness. Now we could not recognize that a
particular thing exemplified a certain principle unless we
also recognized the principle. In other words, to know
that something is of a certain sort entails that you know
the "sort" in question.
I must here pause to make a distinction which will be
familiar to those who have some, acquaintance with
metaphysics between particulars and universal*. Cream,
snow and sheets are all particular white things, but they
all possess a common quality in virtue of which we call
them white. This common quality of whiteness is different
from any one particular white thing; it is also different
from the sum total of all the particular things which
happen to be white. It is usually known in philosophy as
a universal, and the things which possess the property of
being white are spoken of as particulars which manifest
or exemplify the universal whiteness.
Plato, as I have already mentioned, 1 held that universals
possess a being in their own right apart from that of
1 See Chapter II, pp. 57-59*