GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

THE SCOPE OF ETHICS 171
we cannot say anything about them, for to say something
about them would be to describe them in terms of something
else, and to the extent that they are unique such
a description would be a falsification* Not only are moral
judgments unique; they are, the ethical positivist would
assert, indefensible. We cannot, that is to say, in the last
resort give reasons why we ought to do what we ought
to do; we just see that we ought to do it. Moral judgments
cannot, therefore, be validly deduced from some premise
which is more ultimate than the judgment, since they are
themselves ultimate, and, therefore, indefensible. Nor can
we specify any end for the sake of which an action which
we seek to justify by the bestowal of moral approval ought
to be done. For, if the judgment of moral approval is an
ultimate judgment, to say that an act ought to be done,
is to say that the act is its own sufficient justification.
Therefore, although we both know the meaning of ethical
judgments and can communicate this meaning to those
who have had some ethical experience, there cannot, it is
said, be a science of ethics. We cannot, in other words,
answer such questions as, "What is the origin ofmoraljudg ments? How is their authenticity to be recognized? In
what is their justification to be found?" We can, of course,
say what a moral judgment is not, distinguishing it from
which are rationali-
judgments of expediency, or judgments
zations of individual likings and dislikings, but what it
actually is in itself, we can say no more than we can
say what colour is. Now the purpose of ethics as tradition-
ally pursued has often, as I pointed out at the beginning of
the chapter, been conceived to consist in giving an account
of moral judgments. What, ethical philosophers have asked,
is their origin? What is their justification? By reference to
what standard is their correctness or otherwise to be assessed?
If the ethical positivists are right, these are questions which
camK^ be answei^. The condufflonis that although morality
jneally is morality, and although we know what it is, a science
or philosophy of morality is something which should not be
ought, for the reason that it can never be found.