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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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l6o ETHICS<br />

judgment ''these gooseberries are sweet", since each of<br />

the two judgments is about something different The two<br />

judgments are, therefore, according to the definition given<br />

above, subjective judgments. Again, most people would<br />

say, although not perhaps with the same degree of con-<br />

viction, th<strong>at</strong> the two judgments "the colour of the sea is<br />

now blue" and "the colour of the sea is now green" are<br />

subjective, since wh<strong>at</strong> they refer to is not some quality,<br />

namely, blueness or greenness, which is characterizing the<br />

sea, but the effects produced by the sea (or, to be scientifi-<br />

cally precise, by the light waves proceeding from the place<br />

where the sea is) upon the respective retinas of the two<br />

persons making the judgments. These effects are complex<br />

effects, to which the conditions of light, the respective<br />

positions of observ<strong>at</strong>ion, and the different characteristics<br />

of the retinas and general visual appar<strong>at</strong>us of the persons<br />

in question all contribute. For example, one of die two<br />

persons might be colour-blind, so th<strong>at</strong> the colour of the<br />

sea would appear differently to him and to a person of<br />

of normal vision. Because these complex physical and<br />

physiological conditions are different, so too, it might be<br />

said, are the experiences of the persons judging.<br />

I say th<strong>at</strong> the degree of conviction in this case would<br />

probably be less than in the case of experiences origin<strong>at</strong>ing<br />

in the pal<strong>at</strong>e, for the reason th<strong>at</strong> there is a general pre-<br />

supposition to the effect th<strong>at</strong> the colour of things really<br />

belongs to diem in some sense in which their tastes, for<br />

example, whether they are sweet or whether they are<br />

sour, do not. Many of those who have some acquaintance<br />

with idealist arguments 1 would, however, be inclined to<br />

deny th<strong>at</strong> things redly possess colour, and would, therefore,<br />

class the judgments "the sea is now blue" and "the<br />

sea is now green" as subjective in feet, if not in form.<br />

They would, th<strong>at</strong> is to say, maintain th<strong>at</strong> the only st<strong>at</strong>ements<br />

involving colour th<strong>at</strong> we are nalfr entitled to make<br />

are such st<strong>at</strong>ements as, "the sea looks blue to mt", or "the<br />

*Sec my GtMt * PtuloMpb, Chapters I sad II, to so account of

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