04.02.2013 Views

GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

<strong>THE</strong> SCOPE OF ETHICS 149<br />

question of the central problem of ethics, th<strong>at</strong> philosophers<br />

differ most Whereas the Greeks, for example, held th<strong>at</strong><br />

the basic notion of ethics was good, or the Good, and<br />

deduced, therefore, th<strong>at</strong> the main problem of ethics<br />

was to discover the Good, Kant and other eighteenth<br />

century writers held th<strong>at</strong> the bane notion of ethics was<br />

th<strong>at</strong> of moral oblig<strong>at</strong>ion, and th<strong>at</strong> the main problem of<br />

ethics was to discover its ground or source.<br />

(3) THAT IT is DIFFICULT <strong>TO</strong> KEEP ETHICAL QUESTIONS<br />

DISTINCT. In spite of overlapping, the expositor is bound,<br />

so far as he can, in the interests of clarity to tre<strong>at</strong> the<br />

various questions which I have mentioned as if they were<br />

distinct He cannot, it is obvious, write about everything<br />

<strong>at</strong> once, and even if in the end it is found th<strong>at</strong> all the<br />

questions which I have cited are different aspects or forms<br />

of the same question, it is necessary to begin by tre<strong>at</strong>ing<br />

them as though they were separ<strong>at</strong>e questions. The neces-<br />

sity will be apparent, if we take two ethical questions<br />

which seem <strong>at</strong> first sight to be closely allied the question<br />

of the meaning of a right action, and the question of<br />

the standard to which we should refer when we want to<br />

know whether a particular action is right. Th<strong>at</strong> the<br />

question, "wh<strong>at</strong> do we mean by calling an action right? "<br />

is different from the question, "how do we come to know<br />

1<br />

or recognize th<strong>at</strong> an action is right? ', th<strong>at</strong> the question of<br />

ning is, in other words, different from th<strong>at</strong> of standard<br />

or criterion, can be shown by the following example: Let<br />

us consider the proposition "the train leaves King's<br />

Cross <strong>at</strong> 10 a.m. for Edinburgh," which proposition we<br />

will assume to be true. Then the meaning of the proposition<br />

is th<strong>at</strong> there is a complex, physical fact which<br />

the sentence used in the enunci<strong>at</strong>ion of the proposition<br />

expresses. The complex, physical feet is one th<strong>at</strong> we may<br />

loosely describe by saying th<strong>at</strong> a railway engine with<br />

carriages <strong>at</strong>tached to it begins <strong>at</strong> a certain point of time<br />

to alter its position in space, although the complete descrip-<br />

tion of all th<strong>at</strong> we mean when we enunci<strong>at</strong>e this proposition

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!