GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

OBJECTIVE UTILITARIANISM 331
Criticism of Mill's Distinction between Qualities of
Pleasure. The first reflection suggested by this asser-
tion, for it is, indeed, an assertion and not an argument,
is that it is circular. We are told that we may recognize
a superior pleasure by reason of the fact that those best
qualified to judge prefer it. There is, then, a class of persons
possessed of what is to be regarded as superior judgment.
How is this class of person to be recognized? By reference
to what standard is the alleged superiority of their judgment
to be assessed? The answer presumably is, by reference
to the nature of the things which they judge to be
desirable. Now the things which they judge to be desirable
are the superior pleasures. The conclusion is that the
superior pleasures may be known by reason of the fact
that persons of superior judgment prefer them, and persons
of superior judgment by reason of the fact that they prefer
superior pleasures. Mill admittedly proceeds to point out
that people do as a whole prefer the pleasures attendant
upon the exercise of their higher faculties, as compared
with a greater quantity of pleasure produced by the
indulgence of their lower. A wise man would not consent
to be a happy fool; a person of feeling would not consent
to Be base, even for a greater share of pleasure of the
pleasure, that is to say, of the foolish and the base. " It
is better," says Mill, "to be a human being dissatisfied
than a pig satisfied."
The admission is fatal to the position that the only
thing desirable is pleasure. If in a whole X, y is the quantity
of pleasure and z the quantity of something other than
pleasure, which Mill denotes by the adjective "higher",
Mill regards the value of the whole as greater if z is present,
than it is if z is absent. But if y, the quantity of pleasure,
is the only element of value, the amount of z which is
will not affect the value of the whole. It can
present
only affect the whole, if z is regarded as possessing value
in its own right. If, however, z is regarded as being simply
pleasure, and not as higher pleasure, what is the point of
making the distinction between pleasures implied by the