GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

OBJECTIVE UTILITARIANISM 315
the most unfortunate consequences. As I pointed out in
the last chapter, a plausible case may be made for the
view that most of the harm which is done in the world
is the result of the actions of well-meaning but ill-judging
people. I cited the case of war as an example. Now it may
reasonably be urged that there must be something wrong
with a theory which requires us to regard as right, actions
which produce such terrible consequences as those involved
in the declaration and waging of a war, merely because
the motives which lead people to fight in wars are such
as we can respect.
It might be and has been urged in reply that we can
and should divide what purports at first sight to be a
single moral judgment into two separate judgments; that
we can and should pass one judgment on motive and
another on the action which proceeds from the motive.
On this basis, we should be entitled to pass a favourable
judgment on the motive of the enthusiastic volunteer who
goes to war to fight for right and freedom, but an unfavourable
one on the resultant killing and maiming for
which his action is responsible. But this expedient, plausible
as it appears, will not do. For, as I pointed out in the
last
1
chapter, the view that we can in this way limit the
scope of our ethical judgments is not one that can be
sustained. If, as I hope to have shown, we cannot judge
about actions in themselves, we cannot judge about motives
in themselves, and, it may be, we cannot even judge
about consequences in themselves. That which in fact
constitutes the object of our moral judgments, is, I have
suggested, 1 a whole situation of which motive, acts and
consequences are all integral parts.
Difficulties of the "Actual Consequences" Form of
Utilitarianism. The view that the lightness of an act
depends upon its actual consequences, which has been on
the whole the predominant utilitarian view, also leads to
anomalous results: two may be mentioned. First, if this
1 See Chapter VIII, pp. 289-991, * See Chapter VIII, pp. 291, 992.