GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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ETHICS
production of the greatest quantity of happiness,
on the
part of those whose interest is in view." At what point,
he enquired, may a government whose object is the
increase of public happiness legitimately interfere with
the private individual? What, in fact, is the sphere of
individual liberty, what of government interference, and
where should the line be drawn between them? With these
questions I hope to deal in 1
Parts III and IV.
I mention them here only because Bentham's political
preoccupations may serve to discourage us from looking
to him for what he has not to offer, namely, a subtle
analysis of conduct forming the basis of a consistent ethical
theory. This his follower, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873),
sought to provide, with what results we shall see below.*
For the present, our concern is with Bentham's insistence
that the basic principle of morals is what he calls the
principle of "utility", which he states as follows. "By
the principle of utility is meant that principle which
approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever
according to the tendency which it appears to have to
augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose
interest is in question." In other words, the criterion of
the rightness of an action is to be found in the consequences
of the action. Upon this view three observations may
appropriately be made.
First, the criterion envisaged for a right action is an
objective criterion. It is not what any person or body of
persons thinks or feels about an action which makes it right
indeed, the thoughts or feelings of human beings are
irrelevant when we are considering the rightness or
wrongness of actions; what makes an action right is certain
happenings which are produced by, and follow from,
the action. If these are of a certain kind, the action is
right; if not, not.
Secondly, it is clearly impossible, as I have already
pointed out, that we should ever know all the consequences
1 See Chapter XIV, pp. 525-527, and Chapter XIX, pp. 777-781.
See pp. 334-342 below.