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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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OBJECTIVE iNTUITIONISM 185<br />

hundred be a pleasant one, and most egoists have, in<br />

fact, been hedonists. An example of the way in which<br />

an egoistical view can be applied to an apparently dis-<br />

interested sentiment is Hobbes's account of pity* Pity,<br />

he defines, as "fear felt for oneself <strong>at</strong> the Bight of another's<br />

distress". The distress of another person, in other words,<br />

only moves us in so far as it causes us to picture ourselves<br />

in a similar situ<strong>at</strong>ion. It is, in fact, not the other person<br />

th<strong>at</strong> we pity <strong>at</strong> all, but an imagined condition of ourselves.<br />

Butler's Criticism of the Egoistic Account of Pity and<br />

Symp<strong>at</strong>hy. Butler's criticism is instructive and may<br />

be taken as a model reproof for those who, in the interests<br />

of a delusive simplicity, seek to reduce to a single motiv<strong>at</strong>-<br />

ing factor pure and simple the complex elements th<strong>at</strong><br />

compose even the most single-minded of human sentiments,<br />

or inspire even the most straightforward of human<br />

actions. "The truth," as Algernon says in The Important*<br />

of Bring Earrust," is rarely pure and never simple." Butler<br />

out the difficulties in Hobbes's account.<br />

begins by pointing<br />

If, he says, it were true, then the most symp<strong>at</strong>hetic people<br />

would also be the most nervous since, on Hobbes's showing,<br />

they would be the people who were most apprehensively<br />

concerned for their own safety. This, however, is demon*<br />

strably not the case. Moreover, while we admire those<br />

who are symp<strong>at</strong>hetic, we are apt to despise those who<br />

are over-anxious about their own safety, the inference<br />

being th<strong>at</strong> since symp<strong>at</strong>hy and nervousness promote<br />

different reactions in other people, they must be recogniz-<br />

ably different st<strong>at</strong>es of consciousness in the person feeling<br />

them. A third objection is founded on the admitted fact<br />

th<strong>at</strong> we are apt to feel more symp<strong>at</strong>hy for the misfortunes<br />

of our friends than for those of strangers. If Hobbes is<br />

right, we must conclude th<strong>at</strong> the distress of a friend makes<br />

us more anxious about ourselves than the distress of a<br />

stranger. This, Butler contends, is not the case; and<br />

although this contention of his might plausibly be questioned,<br />

it must, I think, be conceded th<strong>at</strong>, although

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