GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

43O / BTHIG8
value are like our sense perceptions; we cannot, after all,
give reasons, to justify our perception that this or that is
red. The fact that our moral judgments cannot be justified
by reasons does not, however, mean that they are not
passed by reason* On the contrary, our reasons are involved
not only in the making of judgments of value, but
also in the desire for those ends which the judgments
affirm to have value. Reason, as the psychologists put it,
has an emotive and conative side. I do not wish to imply
by this conclusion that reason is one thing, feeling another,
desire another. Rather I should prefer to say that our judgments
of value are expressions of our personality as a whole,
and that every element in our personality is, accordingly,
integrated in the making of them. Reason, therefore, is
integrated in the making of them.
The conclusions just enumerated are embodied in the
ensuing Theory of Value.
II. POSITIVE STATEMENT OF
THEORY OF VALUE
That the Recognition of Value is a Universal Human
Attribute. I think that Socrates was right in holding
that all men possess a capacity for recognizing value. We
do, that is to say, on occasion recognize those things which
are ultimately valuable when we are brought into contact
with them, although we do not always recognize them, and
often make mistakes in recognition, taking things to be
valuable which are not. The questions then arise, what
things do we recognize to be ultimately valuable; why do
we make mistakes about them; and what arc the reasons
for our mistakes?
Before I try to answer these questions, let me endeavour
to substantiate my first proposition that we do all possess
a capacity for recognizing value.
Digression on Universals and Particulars. The main
reason for asserting that we possess this capacity is that we