GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

ETHICAL THEORY SURVEYED 415
fail to observe that in postulating the greater value of higher
happiness, that is, ofwhat Dr. Johnson calls the philosopher's
happiness, they are admitting the existence of values other
than happiness. I conclude that the view that happiness
is the only good is not one which can be validly supported
by argument.
Arguments are felt to be needed and are in fact put
forward in its support, because it appears prima facie to
conflict with the deliverances of the moral sense or, if
the expression be preferred, to gainsay our intuitions to
the effect that things other than pleasure possess value.
Yet because these intuitions of value do in fact exist,
because, that is to say, we do feel that some states of consciousness
are higher and not merely more pleasant than
others, inconsistency sooner or later creeps into arguments
which are advanced to show that pleasure is die. only
value.
If the assertion that pleasure is the only value cannot
be supported by argument, it must rest upon an unsup-
ported intuition; but once the fact that it does so is realized,
we have no grounds for resisting the admission of other
unsupported intuitions of value.
The doctrine that the greatest happiness of the greatest
number is a good and ought to be promoted, like the
doctrine that pleasures can differ in quality, affords another
illustration of the difficulty of maintaining the view that
pleasure is the only good. In so far as we admit that we
ought to seek to distribute whatever pleasures there are
evenly, we are surely admitting that we consider justice
and equality to be goods, and admitting therefore, that
we Ought to aim at them as well as at pleasure.
Books
Books critical of Subjectivism and Naturalism.
SORLBY, W. R. Hie Ethics of Naturalism.
BRADLEY, F. H. Ethical Studies.
GREEN, T. H. Prolegomena to Ethics.
Discussions of Htdonism.