GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

ARISTOTLE'S MORALS AND POLITICS I0g
a piece of matter* A limb moves, or a limb causes an
object to move, with the result that matter is displaced in
1
space. Moreover, as I shall try to show, it is impossible,
to say either where an action begins, or where it ends.
may If I . here the fuller discussion which
anticipate
appears on a later page, let us take as an example the action
of forging a cheque. Does the action begin with the neural
disturbance in die brain that initiates the movement in
the motor nervous system which controls the fingers, or
with the travelling of the relevant messages along the
motor nervous system, or with the movements of the hand
that takes up the pen, or with the movements of the
fingers that make the signature? To say that the action
begins with any one of these is, it is obvious, to introduce
an arbitrary break into a continuous process. Similar
difficulties arise when we try to assign an end to the action.
Does the action conclude with the termination of the last
movement of the fingers in making the signature, or with
the movements entailed in blotting and taking up the
cheque, or in stretching out the arm to hand the cheque
over the counter? Where in fact does the action end and
where do its consequtncts begin? It is no easier to answer
than it is to say where it begins. Difficulties of this kind
have led many philosophers to deny that actions in themselves
are ever the objects of ethical judgments, and to
substitute motives, intentions, consequences,
or all of these. 9
Aristotle's Doctrine of the Will. Aristotle includes
both motive and intention in what he calls "choice" or
" deliberate desire ", and we call will. It is the condition
of the will revealed by men's acts which, in his view, is
the true object of ethical judgment. The will as con-
ceived by him comprises two elements, one intellectual,
the other appetitive. The appetitive element is our desire
for a particular result; the intellectual element calculates
1 For a fuller diictmion of the object of our ethical judgments tee
Chapter VIII, pp. 287-295-
See Chapter VIII, pp. 287-295-
'