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Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

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delivery exercised a dominant influence <strong>on</strong> the formati<strong>on</strong><br />

of the U.S. global basing network in Asia <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

throughout the world. 10 Due to the range <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> other<br />

technical limitati<strong>on</strong>s of the U.S. military systems of the<br />

era, U.S. bases were c<strong>on</strong>structed around the world as<br />

necessary to support the executi<strong>on</strong> of the U.S. nuclear<br />

war plan against the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> China. U.S.<br />

bombers, for instance, required forward bases from<br />

which to stage or refuel, or to recover to in the wake of<br />

a strike; similar range c<strong>on</strong>straints dictated the need for<br />

deployment of U.S. missiles <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> basing of U.S. vessels<br />

nearer to the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> China than U.S. territory<br />

could provide. 11<br />

However, in the 1960s, this policy of overweening<br />

reliance <strong>on</strong> nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s began to change.<br />

The “massive retaliati<strong>on</strong>” doctrine’s threat to resort to<br />

nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s early <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> inflexibly in resp<strong>on</strong>se to<br />

a whole range of provocati<strong>on</strong>s always seemed somewhat<br />

suspect at the lower level of escalati<strong>on</strong>. But the<br />

looming advent of an assured Soviet strategic-range<br />

nuclear capability <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> increasing attenti<strong>on</strong> to the difficulties<br />

of c<strong>on</strong>trolling escalati<strong>on</strong> in a nuclear war began<br />

to make such heavy reliance <strong>on</strong> nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s seem<br />

unc<strong>on</strong>sci<strong>on</strong>ably dangerous <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> decreasingly credible<br />

during the later 1950s <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1960s, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> a resort to massive<br />

retaliati<strong>on</strong> seem potentially suicidal. As a result,<br />

calls grew louder to focus more <strong>on</strong> the strengthening<br />

of n<strong>on</strong>-nuclear forces, especially in light of the relative<br />

neglect such forces had suffered during the 1950s. 12<br />

With the entry of the John Kennedy administrati<strong>on</strong><br />

to office in 1961, this shift away from nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s<br />

became U.S. policy. U.S. strategy in all theaters therefore<br />

began a gradual transiti<strong>on</strong> from declared reliance<br />

<strong>on</strong> nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s towards emphasis <strong>on</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-nuclear<br />

forces, though nuclear forces remained central in U.S.<br />

79

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