Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

Expectations for the DDPR are modest, with the
final document possibly amounting to no more than
keeping the process moving <strong>and</strong> the door open. Much
will depend on the priorities assigned in <strong>NATO</strong> capitals
<strong>and</strong> the inevitable distraction of other developments,
including the prospects of elections in several
key countries. In the end, as with all <strong>NATO</strong> processes,
imaginative drafting, <strong>and</strong> the traditional give <strong>and</strong>
take at the last minute will produce a document that
accommodates national differences but leaves their
reconciliation for further elaboration. At some stage,
<strong>NATO</strong> will have to come to terms with its nuclear dilemmas,
but this can happen only under the leadership
of the United States.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10
1. The expression “tactical weapons” is used here to reinforce
the fact that they were deployed with the expressed intent of being
used to alter the conflict on the battlefield. In today’s discussions,
the term “tactical” is no longer used, <strong>and</strong> these weapons are
normally referred to as non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs).
2. The new Strategic Concept is available from www.nato.int/
lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.<strong>pdf</strong>.
3. For a more complete discussion of the meeting in Tallinn,
see Simon Lunn, “Reducing the Role of <strong>NATO</strong>’s <strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Weapons</strong>—Where
Do We St<strong>and</strong> after Tallinn?” RUSI Briefing Note,
June 2010.
4. Ibid.
5. Interviews conducted by the author, November 2011.
6. Ibid.
7. <strong>NATO</strong> Lisbon Summit Declaration, para. 30, November 20,
2010.
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