Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

United States in consulting with its Allies, thus performing
a function similar to that of the Special Consultative
Group (SCG) for the negotiations on Intermediate
Range <strong>Nuclear</strong> Forces (INF) in the 1980s.
NUCLEAR FORCES
In considering what language should be chosen
to describe the purpose of <strong>NATO</strong>’s nuclear weapons
<strong>and</strong> the range of options for the nuclear posture, the
DDPR will have to balance <strong>and</strong> reconcile very different
national interests, concerns, <strong>and</strong> priorities. It is always
difficult to generalize about national views, but
interviews with a range of national representatives
at <strong>NATO</strong> during the past 18 months have revealed
certain broad trends of thought. These may evolve
over time as a result of internal <strong>and</strong> external developments.
Views of <strong>NATO</strong>’s nuclear policy vary widely,
depending on the degree of nuclear involvement of
the country concerned. In some countries, views differ
depending on whether the individuals represent the
Ministry of Defense or Foreign Affairs, each with its
different priorities.
Assessments also need to take account of the fact
that, as previously mentioned, for many members
the nuclear issue is not high on their list of priorities.
Needless to say, views on nuclear policy vary depending
on the degree of involvement. Some countries—
principally the more recent members—continue to
support the presence in Europe of U.S. warheads;
others would not be sorry to see them go; others are
ambivalent. Opinions are stronger among those who
support the status quo than those who seek to change
it. Two factors are common to all members: the relevance
of Russian sub-strategic systems <strong>and</strong> the need
to maintain Alliance unity.
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